Saturday, January 24, 2009

"Hide and Seek" (Music Review)

"Hide and Seek"
Freedom in the Groove
Joshua Redman

Joshua Redman: tenor saxophone
Peter Bernstein: guitar
Peter Martin: piano
Christopher Thomas: bass
Brian Blade: drums

A summa cum laude graduate of Harvard as well as one of the best saxophonists of his generation, Joshua Redman can express himself almost as stylishly with words as with notes. That's why he's one of the few jazz musicians who writes his own liner notes. Freedom in the Groove comes with a little memoir about how he's moved past his "jazz snob"bery to a more inclusive musical taste:

"These days, I listen to, love, and am inspired by all forms of music. And once again, I sense the connections. I feel in much of '90s hip-hop a bounce, a vitality, and a rhythmic infectiousness which I have always felt in the bebop of the '40s and '50s. I hear in some of today's 'alternative music' a rawness, an edge, and a haunting insistence which echoes the intense modalism and stinging iconoclasm of the '60s avant-garde."

The track with the most freedom and best groove is the hip-hop themed opener, "Hide and Seek." Ah, here is the "bounce," the "vitality," the "rhythmic infectiousness" Redman is talking about! As a dabbler in the saxophone myself, I know how hard it is to play anything without moving your body, even though the instrument forces your head down and ties up your hands, making you do a kind of awkward pelican dance. Guitarists dance for show, but sax players do it because they can't help it. Especially not on this song. I can't even listen without dancing.

It starts with Redman's tenor sax a capella, alternating some sparse phrases with a lip-popping technique that mimics a bass line. At 0:18, the rhythm section enters: the real bass takes over and continues a simple but beguiling rhythm, and the drums keep the beat but more or less stay out of the way. Redman states a rather complex, syncopated melody, and if you listen closely you can hear the piano hiding behind the saxophone, playing the same notes.

At 1:35, the rhythm changes noticeably, the piano gets put away, and Bernstein's guitar comes out of hiding. At 1:39 and 2:10 his riffs very satisfyingly fill in gaps in the sax solo; elsewhere he subtly makes the section more rhythmically and harmonically interesting. But of course, Redman's funky saxophone solo is the main attraction. The storytelling, the use of tension and release, the development of melodic and rhythmic motifs is masterful--but a lot less interesting to read about it than to listen to. Here are some things to listen for:

* The echoing of rhythms both long (like the first phrase) and short (like the two-note phrase at 1:53ff), as a development (2:53ff) or as a refrain (2:15).
* The lick at 1:51 works because it so simple, just three quarter notes of the same note in three octaves. The lick at 2:25 works because it so intricate, compared to the rest of the solo.
* The mellow release of tension at 2:09, followed by a head-banging re-entry; the sax and drums are in perfect sync here.
* The pulse in funk, including in this song, is in the first and third beats of the measure. This is where you expect strong phrases to start. But if you listen carefully from about 2:38 to 2:42, you'll find that Redman moves ahead of the pulse a little bit, then lets it catch up with him.
* At 2:51 the improvisation line, like a trapeze artist, is perfectly timed to land on the first note of the second unison section. What we have here is a hipper version of the melody, similar but busier. Note the record-skip effect at 3:12, and the accelerating, oscillating final flourish of the saxophone.

We've been so enthralled, we haven't noticed that in the mean time the guitar has dropped out again and the piano has once again re-entered. Starting not quite as lazily as Redman did, Martin quickly ratchets up the energy level by pounding ever harder with his left hand.

And then, before you know it, we're back where we started. As much as we want the groove to keep going, it has to end. Yet there's one more surprise ahead. The fade is a fake; the finish is a flash.

Wednesday, January 21, 2009

Pick Up Some Rocks (Speech)

Commencement speech for Judson International School, 2008

The sun had just dipped below the rocky hills on the western horizon, and Cody knew from experience exactly how much time he had before dusk would give way to the cold, starry desert night. “Just give me five more minutes, boy,” he said as he patted the neck of the galloping horse underneath him. And then he heard it: a voice, deep and clear and masculine, as if right behind his left ear. “Pick up some rocks and put them in your saddlebag.” Cody jerked the reins sharply backward, bringing the horse to a sudden halt. The flat and barren landscape afforded him a view of miles around, and not another soul could be seen. He had heard enough stories from other cowboys to know that a man’s imagination often begins to play tricks on him after many days in the lonely desert. Still, it had never happened to him before. The horse had started walking again, and Cody spurred it into a faster gait. Then he heard it again, just the same as the first time: “Pick up some rocks and put them in your saddlebag.” Quite unsettled, but determined to keep riding, he cursed under his breath and flung out his arm as if to brush the voice away. But it only repeated, this time louder, with an authority and an urgency that could not be ignored, “Pick up some rocks and put them in your saddlebag.” At this point Cody knew that the only way he could make this eerie, disembodied voice leave him alone was to do what it said. So once again he brought his horse to a halt, this time for good, and with a sigh he dismounted. He stroked the sweaty, heaving sides of the tired bay stallion. Then he untied the leather strings of his dusty saddlebag, bent down, scooped a small handful of gravel into his callused palm, and dropped it into the pouch, whacking it savagely a couple of times for good measure. “Are you happy?” he sneered, turning around. After watering his horse and dining on baked beans cooked over a sagebrush fire, he curled up with his saddle and blanket and tried with all his might to banish the memory of the voice from his mind. Dawn came soon enough, and as Cody saddled his horse again for another hard day’s ride, he suddenly remembered what had happened the night before. He was almost convinced that it was a dream, but just to make sure, he decided to reach into his saddlebag to see if the rocks were there. And what he found nearly knocked him off of his feet. For he held in his hand not gravel, but unmistakable solid gold nuggets. His whoop of joy must have startled all the vultures, snakes and jackrabbits for miles. But it wasn’t long before he himself was startled by a much more sobering thought: “These few little pieces will scarcely get me out of debt. There’s no shortage of rocks in the desert--why didn’t I pick up more? I could have put a great big diamond ring on my girl’s finger, settled down in a big country house, and never had to work again!” But realizing that the voice was gone, the opportunity past, he kicked himself and rode on.

You were all probably afraid that my story would have a moral, and you were right. Every high school student at some point asks the question, “Why do I have to be here? When am I ever going to use this? Why are they forcing to me to learn about hyperbolas, the atomic weight of molybdenum, the ancient city of Mohenjo-Daro, or iambic pentameter when all I want to do with my life is be a stay-at-home parent, or a nurse, or a salesman, or a soldier, or an NBA player, or--since this is Judson International School--a missionary? And besides, I‘m just going to forget it when I leave.” The most common response you will hear is, “Well, you might need it after all at some point in the future.” And that’s true, sometimes surprisingly so. What may seem to you now like useless rocks, nothing but added weight, may turn out to be gold one day. Knowledge is power. Another analogy I find helpful is to think of your brain as a muscle. People who lift weights in the gym are primarily making themselves better at squats and bench presses and arm curls, and those by themselves are not very practical in “real life.” But the strength they gain in the process is useful for all sorts of tasks. In the same way, math teaches you to think carefully and logically and to solve difficult abstract problems, even if you forget how to do logarithms. Science gives you an appreciation of and a mastery over the natural world even if you forget the difference between sulfides and sulfites. History, the study of the past, helps you understand the present--what human beings are like, the way things are now, why they are that way, and why they don’t have to be and probably won’t always be that way--even if you forget which Roman Emperor came after Claudius. English makes you better at speaking and writing, at organizing your thoughts, at paying attention to detail, at seeing patterns, at appreciating beauty, and at thinking about big issues, even if you forget which character is brutally murdered at the end of Pride and Prejudice. (Just kidding.) Furthermore, the better you get at any subject, the less painful it is, and you may even come to enjoy it for its own sake. And here’s something that they don’t usually tell you: all the hours in class listening to lectures, all the homework assignment sheets, all the essays, all the group projects, all the exams--they are training you to show up even when you don’t feel like it, to recognize authority, to follow directions, to plan ahead, to manage your time, to meet deadlines, to cooperate with others, to work hard even when you’re tired, and, very importantly, to endure boredom. These are skills that every job requires. I’m not kidding. Ask anyone.

High school is fun sometimes, but not always. If people tell you that your high school years will be the best time of your life, and it makes you want to throw yourself in front of the school bus, don’t worry--they’re probably wrong. Life will most likely get better after high school. But a lot of that depends on what rocks you pick up during high school. When your formal education is over, you may never get another opportunity to spend several years doing nothing but learning and developing your skills and character. Make the most of it while it lasts. Some rocks you should not expect to pick up, however, are (1) a soul mate, (2) a marketable skill, and (3) all the knowledge you will ever need for the rest of your life.

To use another rock metaphor, people at your age are like wet concrete. You are malleable, more than you realize. This is definitely not something to be ashamed of; it is an opportunity to seize. Everything about you, from the way you dress, to the music you listen to, to the beliefs and attitudes you hold, to your deepest character traits, will be molded into shape by others. By the time you are fully adults, the concrete will have set and become very difficult to change. And then eventually--I won’t say when--the concrete will become brittle and start to crumble! But right now you have the opportunity to choose who your molders are, and what form you will take. And you are responsible for who you become. From Bible times until today the Jews have initiated people about your age into adulthood by a ceremony called a bar mitzvah or bat mitzvah, which means “son of the covenant” or “daughter of the covenant.” That means that you are accountable to obey what is engraved by the finger of God on the two big stone tablets. In Christian terms, you are accountable for the fate of your eternal soul. Our susceptibility to peer pressure is part of how we are made as human beings, and is not in itself bad. Unfortunately, in high school you will almost definitely be subject to bad peer pressure, and there will be times when you will need to stand like a rock. How are you supposed to do that?

Though I’m far from an expert on this matter, I have two suggestions. The first is to think critically, to look at the big picture. Most of what people think is cool and uncool is arbitrary and what they have uncritically picked up from others. Try to stand back from the crowd and ask, “If celebrities have such miserable lives, why does everyone strive so hard to be like them? How many people actually like the so-called popular kids, and how many are just afraid of them? Is chewing gum really going to increase my sex appeal? Why are the guys in the chess club, or the Latin club, or the geology club so ostracized, and what exactly is wrong with getting good grades? Is getting stoned really worth it? Why are rock and hip hop so popular when jazz is clearly superior?” and so on. Find people who like you the way you are; people who make you sell out to be their friends don’t make good friends anyway. When someone says disdainfully, “You’re so sheltered,” realize that he probably means, “You’re different, and I can’t handle that.” When your parents embarrass you with their lack of coolness, realize that they were probably cool when they were in high school and that they think you’re weird, too. Unlike rocks, trends don’t last very long.

Second, and more importantly, Jesus said that the one “who hears my words and puts them into practice … is like a man building a house, who dug down deep and laid the foundation on a rock. When a flood came, the torrent struck that house but could not shake it, because it was well built.” You need to find your identity in the body of Christ. You need to judge the world’s values by the standard of God’s values, not vice versa. Practically speaking, this means time and effort and discipline: studying the Bible, praying, worshiping, being in fellowship with other believers. You may not be used to doing these on your own, or on your own initiative, but now is the time to start. They are essential parts of the mature Christian life. Try to be a witness, but don’t be discouraged if your seeds fall on rocky soil. You will be different, and that may be very difficult and even painful, but remember that diamonds are only formed under incredibly intense heat and pressure. Good night.

Three Poststructuralists Walked Into a Bar (Play)

[THE SCENE: Think Waiting for Godot. A vintage French bar, clean and in good repair, dimly lit, no windows. It could be any time of day or night. Smoke visibly wafts through the confined air, although the room is empty of bartender, patrons, and furniture except for three tall barstools that stand before the empty counter. The walls, the floor, and the shelves behind the counter are all bare. So is the counter itself, except for a large white bowl filled with unshelled, unsalted peanuts.]

[Enter LACAN, DERRIDA, AND FOUCAULT, one at a time. Each walks with a distinctive gait to his respective stool and sits down.]

FOUCAULT [breaking the silence]: Who would have expected that the three of us would ever be in the same room together?

DERRIDA: I thought you two were dead. Actually, I thought I was dead too.

LACAN: I don’t remember ever coming here before. I don’t even remember how I got here now. Where are we?

FOUCAULT: Hell if I know. Are those peanuts?

DERRIDA: [Lifts the bowl and passes it to FOUCAULT. A sheet of paper underneath it, hidden until now, floats to the floor. He stands up, bends over, and picks it up.] It’s a poem. The title is “The Flea,” but no author is given.

FOUCAULT: Three literary theorists, one poem, and no drinks. What else are we going to do? Let’s read it. [DERRIDA hands it to him. FOUCAULT reads “The Flea.” See appendix for text.] Don’t worry; although you two are both good-looking men, and I am a homosexual, and I just read you a seduction poem, it means nothing. [Laughs.]

DERRIDA [to FOUCAULT]: Are you done reading? [Chuckles.]

LACAN: [Gets up.] Excuse my absence; I’ve never been one to flee from a literary discussion, but I have to use the john. [Leaves.]

DERRIDA: Absence… john… and notice that the first word of this poem is “Mark.” It is significant, Michel, that you are not Donne reading. The author of this poem is, in the most literal sense, absent. That is because he is, in the most literal sense, dead. All we have left of him are his traces, marks on paper. Yet “if one admits that writing (and the mark in general) must be able to function in the absence of the sender, the receiver, the context of production, etc., that implies that this power, this being able, this possibility is always inscribed, hence necessarily inscribed as possibility in the functioning or the functional structure of the mark.”

FOUCAULT: Samuel Beckett said, “What does it matter who is speaking?” Remember, Jacques, that the author is dead in a figurative sense as well. For ‘author’ does not mean ‘writer.’ “An anonymous text posted on a wall probably has a writer—but not an author. The author function is therefore characteristic of the mode of existence, circulation, and functioning of certain discourses within a society.” The death of the author is simply the discovery that he never truly existed in the first place—that he is a social construction, a creation of discourse.

DERRIDA: What do you mean by the “author function”?

FOUCAULT: Like all discursive functions, the author function is an exercise of control: not a simple and spontaneous event but “a series of specific and complex operations.” Historically, the invention of the author “constitutes the privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas.” First, it controls what can be said or written. The importance of attributing words, texts, ideas to specific individuals arose in the Middle Ages “to the extent that authors became subject to punishment”—that is, it arose out of the need to control what was said. Even then, discourse was not a thing to be owned but an act to be performed. But with the rise of capitalism, texts began to be seen as property, which by the beginning of the nineteenth century brought into a being a new form of control: copyright laws. Second, the author function controls which texts are privileged. “It has not always been the same types of texts which have required attribution to an author.” In ancient times, and in the Middle Ages, ‘literary’ texts were valued even if anonymous, “since their ancientness was regarded as a sufficient guarantee of their status.” ‘Scientific’ texts, however, were authoritative only when they were attributed to an authority, such as Aristotle or Ptolemy. By the eighteenth century, this situation had reversed itself. An epistemological break, shift, or rupture had taken place. The new ‘scientific method,’ which (in its own words) emphasized ‘reason’ and ‘observation,’ had ousted the old practice of deferring to the ancients on questions of nature. Scientific texts were now seen as valid by virtue of the universality and repeatability of their findings. But literary texts…

DERRIDA: If I may interrupt, and bring the discussion back to the poem at hand, you mentioned repeatability, and I think that it’s this structure of repeatability, or what I call ‘iterability,’ that both extends and limits the power of signs. “No meaning can be determined out of context, but no context permits saturation.” That is, it is the nature of a sign that can be repeated in different contexts, but since the context is different each time, the meaning of the sign will be different each time as well. We can see this in “The Flea” with, for example, the word ‘this.’ It’s used several different ways: “this flea” (line 1), “mark in this” (end of line 1), “this cannot be said” (line 5), “this our marriage bed” (line 12). You may be thinking that this is not a startling discovery, for this shifting of reference is the nature of a pronoun. But still, from the fact that no two instances of ‘this’ are ever identical—that it never means the same thing twice—it follows that the meaning of ‘this’ can never be fully present to us. Not even for the author-speaker-writer. “Writing is dangerous from the moment that representation there claims to be presence and the sign of the thing itself. And there is a fatal necessity, inscribed in the very functioning of the sign, that the substitute make one forget the vicariousness of its own function and make itself pass for the plenitude of a speech whose deficiency and infirmity it nevertheless only supplements.” To put it another way, the supplement can never fill the void; it will always itself require a supplement. Consider what happens when we try to pin down the meaning of, say, the ‘this’ at the end of the first line. Immediately when it is uttered, it has no reference at all. It is a ‘this’ of anticipation. Its content is suspended, deferred to the next line. Yet the next line reads, “How little that which thou deniest me is.” Once again the meaning is deferred: how little is that ‘little’? Indeed, for the rest of the poem the speaker tries to answer this question. But as he does so his analogy-argument raises metaphysical, moral, even biological questions, and like Tantalus, the further he follows it the further it recedes, endlessly. This endlessness characterizes all texts. So it was half in jest that I asked you earlier, “Are you done reading?”

FOUCAULT: And, as I was about to say earlier, it is this elusiveness of meaning and consequent proliferation of interpretation that is the enemy of power, that society cannot tolerate, that the author function was meant to stop. [Puts the poem down on the counter and places the bowl of peanuts on top of it.] So the third way the author function exercises control is by fixing meaning, by limiting interpretation. The ‘author’ is “a constant level of value”—all of his texts must meet a standard of ‘quality.’ He is “a field of conceptual or theoretical coherence,” meaning that his ideas hang together without contradiction. He is a “stylistic unity” and “a historical figure at the crossroads of a certain number of events.” Of course, “these aspects of an individual which we designate as making him an author are only a projection, in more or less psychologizing terms, of the operations that we force texts to undergo, the connections that we make, the traits that we establish as pertinent, the continuities that we recognize, or the exclusions that we practice.” So the author function is what keeps me from attributing “The Flea” to Walt Whitman.

DERRIDA: Or reading it as a speech by one Tibetan Buddhist monk to another.

FOUCAULT: Exactly. And it’s what causes you to read it as ‘poetry’ rather than prose, as a ‘work’ with inherent value, as a unity, and so on. It lumps it into that discursive formation, the category of ‘literature.’

DERRIDA: I would have to agree. “There is no such thing as a literary essence or a specifically literary domain strictly identifiable as such… this name of literature perhaps is destined to remain improper, with no criteria, or assured concept or reference, so that ‘literature’ has something to do with the drama of naming.”

[Suddenly FOUCAULT chokes on a peanut. LACAN returns just in time, puts his arms around him from behind, and thrusts his knuckles into FOUCAULT’s solar plexus until the peanut in question rockets across the room.]

DERRIDA: Who taught you the Heimlich maneuver?

LACAN: Who taught me everything I know? Sigmund Freud.

FOUCAULT: It’s uncanny that you got back right when you did. That peanut could have killed me!

DERRIDA: Heimlich… Freud… kill… uncanny... That reminds me an essay that Freud wrote in 1919, called “The Uncanny.” ‘Uncanny’ is the English translation of the German word unheimlich, which is of course the opposite of heimlich, and Freud spends several pages listing dictionary definition after dictionary definition, trying to convey the sense of the latter word. (It means, roughly, ‘familiar.’) But at the end of this section, something very curious happens: the meanings of heimlich and unheimlich begin to shade into one another. “Heimlich comes to have the meaning usually ascribed to unheimlich.” Freud tries to explain the significance of the shift this way. Heimlich has another meaning, ‘hidden’; perhaps the connection is that both the familiar and the hidden are very close to us, very private. That which “ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light”—that is, become familiar—is strange and frightening to us, both heimlich and unheimlich at once. My point is that this phenomenon, which I sometimes playfully call “the heimlich maneuver,” in which a word comes to mean both itself and its opposite, is quite common in language. We see it in “The Flea” with the word ‘kill’ in line 16. It has its current meaning, of course, but the speaker is punning on a second meaning: in the seventeenth century ‘die’ was slang for sexual intercourse. Why would this same word refer both to the act of destroying life and the act of creating it? Because, as I have always said, every word is inscribed into its opposite. Bringing a new life into the world also brings a new death into the world that wouldn’t have happened otherwise, since everyone who is born will one day die. And everything depends for existence on the non-existence of the other. Creating this particular life excludes the possibility of creating other lives.

LACAN: Everyone knows that, Jacques. You’ve always been good at stating the obvious. But in the unconscious we find a much more profound connection between sex and death. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud wrote that the psyche has two drives: Eros, the pleasure principle, and Thanatos, the death drive. ‘Drive’ is not the same as ‘instinct’; it organizes our thoughts and actions, it underlies all of our strivings but can never be satisfied, it keeps us always in motion, always in tension, always chasing after that indefinite missing something (what I call the ‘objet petit a’) but never catching it, always seeking to fill the void but always remaining empty.

FOUCAULT: When are our drinks going to come?

LACAN: Keep waiting, my friend. Freud was right about the drive, and about Eros and Thanatos as motivating factors. But he was wrong in making a sharp distinction between them. I’m surprised you didn’t point out another connection between sex and death in the poem. The speaker in the poem wants what the flea has—the mistress’s body—even though the flea dies in the third stanza. Unconsciously, at least, he wants both sex and death. In fact, “every drive is sexual in nature and at the same time every drive is a death drive.”

FOUCAULT: How do you mean?

LACAN: To explain this, I’ll need to take a long detour through my theory of the unconscious, the imaginary and symbolic orders, and jouissance. I hope you’re both comfortable.

DERRIDA: Well, considering that we’re not in France.

LACAN: When I was in the lavatory a few minutes ago, washing my hands, I looked up and saw a handsome Frenchman staring straight back at me. For me, seeing my own reflection in the mirror was not a very significant event. But for the infant such an experience is decisive. When he comes to recognize the image in the mirror as himself, he begins to grasp the distinction between himself and the world. At the same time, seeing himself from the outside, as other people see him, he appears unified, in control. The infant at this stage is still in the ‘imaginary order’ because he still identifies himself with images, not yet with symbols. This misrecognition, this illusion of the unity of the self, of ‘identity’ (Latin for ‘sameness’), that disguises the psyche’s inner fragmentation, brings the ego into being. Mediated through the other’s gaze, the ego is forever alienated from itself. What brings our infant—let’s call him ‘Jackie’…

DERRIDA: That was my given name, you know.

LACAN: Was it? Then it should help you to identify with him. As I was saying, what brings little Jackie out of the imaginary order and into the ‘symbolic order’ is the intrusion of a third party, the ‘Name-of-the-Father.’ You both know Freud’s story of the Oedipus complex; I don’t think it’s literally true, but I like to use it as an allegory. Because of the father, Jackie comes to realize that his mother’s desire is not only for him, and that he cannot have her all the time. He experiences lack, absence. He begins to learn language, which is founded on absence: we speak of things that are not there, and words only have meaning because of difference, by not being other words. And there is a more profound sense in which language is always lacking. You were on to something, Jacques, when you spoke of the logic of supplementarity, the impossibility of full presence. The relation of the signifier to the signified is always arbitrary. (That is why, on my trip to the bathroom earlier, I saw two identical doors, behind which were, I assume, two identical rooms, but one was marked ‘Ladies’ and the other ‘Gentlemen.’) But the process of signification can never cross the bar between signifier and signified; the signifier only ever refers to other signifiers, in an endless chain, and there is “an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier.” We can never access the real, that which is behind the play of symbols. I call this feature of human existence ‘separation.’ But I digress. The other sense in which the entrance of the father pushes Jackie into the symbolic order is by defining him in a predetermined differentiated role in the symbolic structure of social relations. Jackie, as his mother’s son, cannot be fulfill his desire to be her lover (thus the father, as Law, enforces the incest taboo), and as his father’s son, he must submit to his authority.

FOUCAULT: That’s all very fascinating, but weren’t we talking about “The Flea”?

LACAN: Yes, I’m getting to that. If I am right that the speaker wants what the flea has, then the “suck’d … sucks” in line 3 and “pamper’d” in line 8 give the situation obvious Oedipal overtones. Speaker and mistress take on the symbolic positions of mother and child. What gives occasion to the poem—an instance of speech, of language, of the symbolic order—in the first place is the speaker’s unfulfilled and never fulfilled sexual desire for his mistress. The reason he cannot have her, and why the union he describes in words (the signifier) never comes to pass in fact (the signified) is because of a third party in the background, “though parents grudge,” the Name-of-the-Father, the imposition of Law, of prohibition, which is because of their symbolic status as unmarried. The mistress’s sole desire is not for the speaker; she desires to please this father-figure as well. The number “three” is everywhere in this poem, from the three stanzas with nine lines each to the allusions to the Christian trinity. But for the third party of the father, the speaker substitutes the third party of the flea. Having penetrated the mistress, having united its blood with hers, the flea represents the phallus—that ‘transcendental signifier’ of lack—and in the speaker’s mind it has finally attained jouissance—that ending point of signification, that which we never reach but always think the other has.

DERRIDA: All of that gives me an idea. This poem could be read as an attempted deconstruction of the married/unmarried opposition, but we’ll save that for another time. Instead, I’d like to focus on how the flea, as you described it, provides an interesting starting point for a deconstruction of sexual difference. What do I mean by deconstruction? Many structuralist thinkers have shown how our thinking forms a system of binary oppositions; a deconstruction seeks to dismantle these oppositions, to “demonstrate how one term of an antithesis secretly inheres within the other” (Eagleton 115). Some people misconceive of it as the Fishy business of making a text say whatever you want it to say; actually, the goal is carefully to draw out the inherent contradictions. In his Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel performed the first deconstruction, or at least the most famous one, by showing how the master actually depends upon the slave for his identity. The master is a parasite, like a flea. Historically, the man/woman opposition coincides with a number of other oppositions, each of which is hierarchical and privileges the former term: master/slave, independent/dependent, active/passive, culture/nature, reason/passion, and so on. As the speaker compares himself to the flea, however, he subverts all of them. Though man has represented himself as independent and self-sufficient, the giver and provider, the speaker admits, perhaps unwittingly, that he is a parasite: he needs her to satisfy his desire, while she does not appear to need him. Indeed, man is, from conception, from birth, dependent upon woman, as the reference to sucking in line 3 suggests. Though, as the only one speaking in the poem, the speaker appears to be the master, the one in power, the mistress is in fact fully in control of the situation. In a stunning reversal, he becomes associated with an insect, the realm of nature, while in her chastity she represents the authority of cultural institutions. And his semblance of a logical argument thinly disguises an irrational passion.

LACAN: Speaking of disguises, let me continue from where I left off earlier in describing the formation of the psyche. As I explained, the ego is a creation of the imaginary order. The subject (Latin for ‘thrown under’), on the other hand, is a creation of the symbolic order. As we come to inhabit the symbolic order, we are subjected to a system that existed before us and will exist after us, that we did not create and that we cannot substantially change. It limits the ways we can think and the ways we can express our desire. You’ll notice that “The Flea” is written in first person. The pronoun ‘I,’ the necessity of thinking of ourselves as singular and unified, disguises the fragmentation of the self, the fact that “there is always a disjunction between the subject of enunciation and the subject of the utterance; in other words, the subject who speaks and the subject who is spoken.”

FOUCAULT: This plurality of reference of ‘I’ is even truer of writing. We commonly distinguish between the author and the speaker of a poem, but “all discourses endowed with the author function,” even mathematical textbooks, “possess this plurality of self.” Changing the subject, though, it’s disappointing to me that both of your interpretations have remained in the realm of abstract speculation about language or about the psyche, and that you’ve neglected the poem as material, socially embodied communicative act. What does the fact that the male is the sole speaker and the female is denied a voice tell us about the relations of power in seventeenth-century England? How is the speaker constructing the situation for the mistress with his discourse? How do the institutions to which the poem refers—the church, the family structure—exercise control? How does the poet perceive and present sexuality? These, to me, are far more interesting questions. [Yawns.] But they are questions for another time. Enough speaking about writing—I’m thinking about drinking. Where is that bartender?

DERRIDA: Like the messiah, like democracy, always coming, never arriving.

[Very long, Beckett-like pause. The walls begin to collapse.]

LACAN: You know, there’s something more than a little odd about what’s been going on right now, and I’ve just realized what it is. We’re all speaking in English! Using American idioms, no less! And our understanding of our own theories has been at the pathetic level of, say, a college sophomore. What is going on?

[In a mighty crash, the entire building caves in, leaving only the three theorists on their barstools, and revealing a dark, barren moonscape. Minos, the administrative demon of Dante’s Inferno, appears.]

LACAN: I get the feeling we’re not in Paris any more.

MINOS [in a thin and ghastly voice]: Well, this isn’t all that different, is it? You three certainly didn’t qualify for Heaven, or even Purgatory, and Plato decided he didn’t want your eternal company in Limbo either.

LACAN: It’s all your fault, Jacques!

MINOS: Here in the underworld we like to make the punishment fit the crime. Having your texts misread, having your ignorant successors put words in your mouths, having two other poststructuralists for company… it seemed so exquisite! Enjoy your stay.

[Fade to black.]

Walking on Water (Speech)

(The following was given at the Wheaton College Philosophy Department Chapel in March of 2007.)

I’d like to offer a meditation on Matthew 14:22-33, a passage that has fascinated me for a long time.

Immediately Jesus made the disciples get into the boat and go on ahead of him to the other side, while he dismissed the crowd. After he had dismissed them, he went up on a mountainside by himself to pray. When evening came, he was there alone, but the boat was already a considerable distance from land, buffeted by the waves because the wind was against it.
During the fourth watch of the night Jesus went out to them, walking on the lake. When the disciples saw him walking on the lake, they were terrified. “It’s a ghost,” they said, and cried out in fear.
But Jesus immediately said to them: “Take courage! It is I. Don’t be afraid.”
“Lord, if it’s you,” Peter replied, “tell me to come to you on the water.”
“Come,” he said.
Then Peter got down out of the boat, walked on the water and came toward Jesus. But when he saw the wind, he was afraid and, beginning to sink, cried out, “Lord, save me!”
Immediately Jesus reached out his hand and caught him. “You of little faith,” he said, “why did you doubt?”
And when they climbed into the boat, the wind died down. Then those who were in the boat worshiped him, saying, “Truly you are the Son of God.”


While I don’t think that Matthew had any allegorical intentions for this story, or that if he were here he would endorse everything I’m about to do with it, I do think it has some interesting analogies to the situation that all of us are in: trying to be Christian intellectuals.

Jesus’ disciples are in a boat on the Lake of Galilee during a fierce storm. This is something like the position of the church in society, and especially like the position of a Christian institution like Wheaton College in the subsociety of academia, or mainstream intellectual culture. Though I don’t want to exaggerate, the wind is against this boat. Academia operates with different assumptions, values, and commitments than Christians do; it plays by different rules than Christian thought does; it has created plausibility structures that are unfavorable to Christianity. Which is not to say that it is a stable environment: it is constantly being swept by powerful “winds” (academic windbags) and “waves” (academic fads). The boat is a relatively—but only relatively—safe place to be. Although it absorbs much of the shock, it is still “buffeted” by these winds and waves. For the last couple of hundred years or so, and for the foreseeable future, Christian thought has been mostly on the defensive, reacting and responding to challenges rather than setting the agenda.

But some people, like Peter, aren’t content to stay in the boat and for whatever reason want to feel the full fury of the storm. This was how I fancied myself when I came to Wheaton, and surely it’s true of many of the people here. It can’t be an accident that Wheaton has a larger share of philosophy majors than most colleges do. Plato was right in saying that philosophy begins with aporias, and bringing two worldviews into contact is a very effective way to generate these.

In my opinion, the path of the Christian intellectual should not be undertaken without fear and trembling. There are some very powerful and very persuasive challenges to Christian doctrines and Christian worldviews, some explanations and interpretations of things that seem to make better sense than traditional Christian ones. Furthermore, the gospel is foolishness to the Greeks (the philosophers) and a stumbling block to the wise (the learned, the intellectuals). It has elements that are dogmatic, offensive, and paradoxical nearly to the point of being irrational. I highly doubt that a completely satisfactory integration of faith and learning, free of tensions and anomalies, will ever be possible in this life. Certainly, trying to be both a Christian and an intellectual is harder than trying to be one or the other. Many people who try it either retreat back to the boat or sink, and lose their faith. I’ve seen friends of mine do both. And I want to say that the former is by far the better option, and that there’s no shame in it. In many cases it’s not cowardice but prudence. I believe that God prefers the naïve believer to the sophisticated skeptic. Once I thought that all Christians should study philosophy, but now I doubt that it’s beneficial for everybody all the time. Jesus doesn’t command Peter to get out of the boat—it is Peter’s idea—and he doesn’t rebuke the other disciples for not getting out. In fact, Jesus’ most beloved disciple, John, stays inside.

I don’t want to paint too bleak of a picture, but we don’t do anyone any favors by denying or downplaying these dangers. They are real. And I don’t mean to imply, by the way, that “we scholars, we philosophers” are a spiritual elite with a superior vocation. Every path has its own spiritual dangers, and those of philosophy are probably not the greatest. We may analyze imagined ethical dilemmas in philosophy, but we are unlikely to be put in real ones.

So, in light of all I’ve said, why should we Christians try to be intellectuals too? Why should we subject ourselves to these hazards? When Peter sees Jesus in the distance, walking on the water, he is just not content to stay in the boat. By virtue of his personality, he is impelled to go to him, to see this miracle and this marvelous man up close. Now, all of us have probably been asked why on earth we’re studying philosophy, how we plan to make money with our philosophy degrees, and so on. And we realize that there is no convincing practical or utilitarian justification for it. But some of us are just impelled; by virtue of our personalities—which are quite different than Peter’s in this respect, but remember that this is an analogy—we are fascinated by abstract problems, captivated by intellectual beauty, moved by the love of wisdom for its own sake. And as Christians, we have an even deeper motivation. Different people experience God in different ways, and for us, the way to our hearts is through our brains. We want to love God with all our minds, and we want that love to abound more and more in knowledge and depth of insight. We want to know God and the world he has created, including ourselves, with as much clarity and fullness as is humanly possible. We feel that we can only do this if we commit ourselves to rigorous intellectual honesty, experiencing the full force of the challenges to that knowledge. And like Peter, we trust that, though what we are doing is dangerous, Jesus will keep us safe.

Peter gets out of the boat and walks a few steps. I imagine that he is thrilled, because men don’t defy gravity—but terrified, because men don’t defy gravity. Like deconstruction, but much, much better, this is “an experience of the impossible.” His mind can only sustain the tension for a few steps, when the terror wins out, and he begins to sink. He cries out, and immediately Jesus catches him by the hand and pulls him to safety. “You of little faith,” [Jesus] says, “why did you doubt?”

I’d like to give Jesus some credit here by avoiding an anachronistic reading of these words. Peter’s conflict is, importantly, not between “reason” and “faith.” Especially not when, as is too often the case, reason is conceived as grounded belief and faith is conceived as ungrounded belief. In my epistemology seminar we entertained and rejected the thesis of “doxastic voluntarism,” the idea that you can make yourself believe a proposition p, irrespective of its plausibility, just by deciding to. If we were right that this is impossible, it would be unfair of Jesus to demand it. To digress a bit, however, something you can learn in philosophy is that pitting reason against faith is a false polarization. There are a hundred ways to show that there can be no view from nowhere, no complete escape from epistemic circularity, and no thinking without presuppositions; there can be no self-evident truths, no indubitable beliefs, and no inescapable arguments; all thinking, even the most rigorously scientific, must involve relying on authority, privileging some intellectual values over others, and being committed to ideals and to extra-rational goals. Philosophy qua philosophy is too limited in scope to answer many of the specific objections to Christianity, but it can help you avoid the dangerous fallacy of judging Christian beliefs against false standards of rationality.

Anyway, Peter suffers a great deal of cognitive dissonance, but of a different sort. On the one hand, he has an intuitive grasp of the laws of physics and physiology. He knows that he can’t stay afloat in stormy waters, and that if he sinks, he will drown. And this is not just theoretical for him, it is so deeply ingrained that walking on the water terrifies him. On the other hand—and this is the key—he knows that Jesus is much more than a man. He has seen him work miracles in the past, with his own eyes he sees him walking on the water now, and he has Jesus’ assurance that he will be safe. So you could say that Peter has at least as much evidence, at least as much of a rational case, at least as much epistemic justification, for trusting Jesus as for doubting him—although it’s a very different, incommensurable kind of justification. Peter has already affirmed Jesus’ divinity verbally, and this is a chance for him to affirm it, if you like, existentially. The great challenge for him now is to hold to this belief, to focus on the person of Jesus who is waiting for him on the lake, against the very strong power of his human instincts and emotions and the very real wind and waves that are surrounding him. But holding these truths in his mind is an act of the will. And it is for this failure that Jesus chides Peter. I think you will find that whenever the Bible talks about faith and doubt, it means it in this sense. Others may read the scene differently, but I imagine that Jesus is disappointed but not angry here, and that his voice is not harsh but gentle. At least Peter was willing to make the attempt, and no other mortal has ever walked as far on water as he did.

To elaborate this theme a bit I’m going to quote, without apology, from C. S. Lewis. This is from The Great Divorce, a conversation between one of the citizens of heaven, Dick, and one of the citizens of hell, a former believer.

“Do you really think people are penalized for their honest opinions? Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that those opinions were mistaken. […] There are indeed [intellectual sins], Dick. There is hidebound prejudice, and intellectual dishonesty, and timidity, and stagnation. But honest opinions fearlessly followed—they are not sins. […] [Mine] were not only honest but heroic. I asserted them fearlessly. When the doctrine of the Resurrection ceased to commend itself to the critical faculties which God had given me, I openly rejected it. I preached my famous sermon. I defied the whole chapter. I took every risk.” “What risk? What was likely to come of it except what actually came—popularity, sales for your books, invitations, and finally a bishopric? […] Let us be frank. Our opinions were not honestly come by. We simply found ourselves in contact with a certain current of ideas and plunged into it because it seemed modern and successful. […] We were afraid of crude Salvationism, afraid of a breach with the spirit of the age, afraid of ridicule, afraid (above all) of real spiritual fears and hopes. […] Having allowed oneself to drift, unresisting, unpraying, accepting every half-conscious solicitation from our desires, we reached a point where we no longer believed the Faith. Just in the same way, a jealous man, drifting and unresisting, reaches a point at which he believes lies about his best friend: a drunkard reaches a point at which (for the moment) he actually believes another glass will do him no harm. The beliefs are sincere in the sense that they do occur as psychological events in the man’s mind. If that’s what you mean by sincerity they are sincere, and so were ours. But errors which are sincere in that sense are not innocent.”

God seems to have a great respect for our cognitive autonomy. He seems unwilling, most of the time, to reach in and change our beliefs or to take away our doubts, even when we want Him to. But he has given us ways to stay faithful. Our minds work in coherentist fashion: we throw explanatory nets around the facts and theories that float to the surface of our consciousness. It’s also just a fact of our psychology that the facts and theories nearest the surface will be the ones we have most recently, or most powerfully, been exposed to. That’s why it’s important to continue dredging up the ones that bolster our faith—especially when we are bombarded by disturbing evidence, arguments that make Christianity seem very weak and pale and implausible, and the very powerful and not-to-be-underestimated social pressure to conform once we step out from under the Christian umbrella. This reminding is one of the reasons why we share our testimonies, remember God’s activity in the lives of others now and in the past, study the Bible, listen to sermons that tell us what we already know, participate in the liturgy, and worship. This isn’t my idea, it’s at least as old as Deuteronomy, when God institutes the yearly feasts to commemorate his mighty acts of deliverance, tells the Israelites to talk about the commandments “when you sit at home and when you walk along the road, when you lie down and when you get up,” and warns them, “be careful you do not forget the Lord, who brought you out of Egypt, out of the land of slavery.”

These acts of remembering—which again are acts of the will—are vital spiritual disciplines. But I don’t claim that they make anyone impervious to doubt. Not even the presence of Jesus in the flesh, right in front of him, keeps Peter from doubting, and I doubt that any of us can do better. When Peter begins to sink, he cries out for help. I hope that you and I, when we begin to sink, will always have the humility to cry for help as well, to say, “Lord, I want to believe, help my unbelief.” If I can share some of my own experience, I can think of three or four times in the last few years when I nearly reached the breaking point, when the cognitive dissonance was nearly unbearable. Each of those times, I had to surrender my intellectual pride and decide that my identity as a Christian was more important than my self-image as a thinker. I am not a very spiritually sensitive person, but those are some of the few times I am willing to say that I have felt the hand of God. Those are the moments that I need to continually bring to the surface of my mind. And it was only after those crisis moments, after sorting out those priorities, that I began to see new possibilities for integration.

In conclusion, if I had to boil down my four years of reflection on these questions to one statement, it would be this. If you take this narrow path of trying to be a Christian intellectual, if you decide to walk this tightrope, you probably won’t remain a Christian unless you really want to. If you aren’t committed, you will find it easy to leave the faith and easy to justify your decision. But if you are committed, though you may undergo some mental anguish and spiritual strife along the way, you need not fear losing your soul. I hope that I, and everybody here, will one day join the great crowd of witnesses who testify to this.

Madame Bovary (Poem)

My experiment with a humorous form called the "double dactyl" or "higgledy-piggledy."

Poor Madame Bovary!
Marriage and life in the
countryside aren’t what she
dreamed of, somehow.

Flagrant adultery,
habits of purchasing
greatly beyond what her
means would allow,

go undetected by
Charles, her husband, whose
wits aren’t much sharper than
those of a cow.

Creditors knocking, she
ends her existence with
handfuls of arsenic.
Look at her now!

On the Wheaton Quad (Poem)

Upon a grassy meadow kissed with snow,
Where in the spring, lads love the discus throw,
East of the healer and apothecary,
West of the convent and the monastery,
South of the great hall of the alchemists,
Beside the fountain whose refreshing mists
With winter’s advent every year run dry—
Awaiting thee, in earnest, shall stand I.

To a Pretty Girl (Poem)

“A flock of sheep just shorn”—thus Solomon
described a lady’s smile. My lesser pen
and smaller repertoire of metaphors
can’t find an apt analogy for yours.
But surely I could be inspired to find it
if I knew the lovely lady who’s behind it.
Let us arrange a place and time to meet;
until then, may your days and nights be sweet.

To a Smart Girl (Prose Poem)

On an evening several fortnights past, you may recollect, as it remains vividly in my own memory, that there emerged in conversation between us the recognition of a mutual high regard, perhaps even higher in you than in myself, for a certain novel which we both had eagerly read, I once and you even twice, ere we made each other’s acquaintance. I mention its title purely for the sake of formality, not doubting that you have at once discerned the work of which I speak, being none other than Jane Eyre, written last century by Miss Charlotte Bronte, alias Currer Bell. I recall with equal vividness your admiration excited by its plot, the resolution of which left you thoroughly satisfied, yet also by its elegant diction, notwithstanding the mildly archaic nature thereof, or indeed, perhaps as a result of it; whereupon I immediately resolved, and further, made my resolution known, to write to you a letter in which I strove to emulate for your amusement the aforementioned style. You and you alone shall judge whether my all to limited powers have succeeded or failed in this undertaking; if the latter, I beg that you meet the humble attempt not with disdain but with recognition of the sentiments that inspired it. I must needs also express my sincerest regret that this letter has been delayed, owing solely to my own deplorable dilatory habits, for so long that your expectations of receiving it may have dimmed, nay, faded altogether. Yet I am consoled by the hope that its unexpectedness may now add to the pleasure of its reception. Any time I have spent upon its composition, any pennies I have spent upon its postage, I shall consider an exceeding small investment if it bring to your lovely countenance even the faintest glimmer of a smile. I remain, sincerely, your obedient servant,

J. B.

Frankenstein, the Modern Prometheus (Long Essay)

The full title of Mary Shelley’s famous novel is Frankenstein, Or, The Modern Prometheus. What follows is a close reading showing that not only is the title character a modern equivalent of the ancient Greek god, but the novel as a whole is a modern equivalent to the ancient Greek myth. As far as I know, this is an original argument. It's also a demonstration of how "subtexts" work.

A subtext is another text “through” which a primary text is meant to be read, and with reference to which it draws its significance. It provides a kind of harmony, consonant or dissonant, to the melody of the text. Thus the way the text departs from the subtext can be as significant as the way it follows it. For example, another subtext for Frankenstein is Milton’s Paradise Lost. When the Monster says to Dr. Frankenstein, “Evil be thou my good,” the reader is meant to recognize the words as Satan’s, and think of the Monster as a great but fallen being in everlasting and self-destructive rebellion against his creator. On the other hand, when he tells Frankenstein about the first time he looked at his reflection in the pond, saying, “I became fully convinced that I was in reality the monster I am,” the reader is meant to recognize the contrast to the scene in Milton’s epic in which Eve first sees her own reflection and marvels at how beautiful she is.

Shelley uses the Prometheus myth as a subtext for her retelling of it, both in obvious and subtle ways: in language, in imagery, in symbolism, in plot, in characterization, and in meaning. Here is the relevant section of the Prometheus myth—which is actually part of a much longer myth cycle—from Robert Graves’ book The Greek Myths:

"[Prometheus, who had formed mankind out of clay, was the wisest of the Titans,] and Athene, at whose birth from Zeus’s head he had assisted, taught him architecture, astronomy, mathematics, navigation, medicine, metallurgy, and other useful arts, which he passed on to mankind. But Zeus, who had decided to extirpate the whole race of man, and spared them only at Prometheus’s urgent plea, grew angry at their increasing powers and talents . . . [and withheld] fire from mankind. Prometheus at once went to Athene, with a plea for a backstairs admittance to Olympus, and this she granted. On his arrival, he lighted a torch at the fiery chariot of the Sun and presently broke from it a fragment of glowing charcoal, which he thrust into the pithy hollow of a giant fennel-stalk. Then, extinguishing his torch, he stole away undiscovered, and give fire to mankind. Zeus swore revenge. He ordered Hephaestus to make a clay woman, and the four Winds to breathe life into her, and all the goddesses of Olympus to adorn her. This woman, Pandora, the most beautiful ever created . . . opened a box, which Prometheus had warned Epimetheus to keep closed, and in which he had been at pains to imprison all the Spites that might plague mankind: such as Old Age, Labor, Sickness, Insanity, Vice, and Passion. Out these flew in a cloud . . . [and] attacked the race of mortals. Delusive Hope, however, whom Prometheus had also shut in the box, discouraged them by her lies from a general suicide. . . . Zeus had Prometheus chained naked to a pillar [in most versions, a cliff] in the Caucasian mountains, where a greedy vulture [in some versions, an eagle] tore at his liver all day, year in, year out; and there was no end to the pain, because every night (during which Prometheus was exposed to cruel frost and cold) his liver grew whole again" (Graves 144-145).

Shelley’s novel uses what is called interpolated narration—it nests narrative within narrative like a Russian doll. Moving from the outside inward, we have Shelley herself, the novelist, giving voice to Robert Walton, who is writing to his sister; Walton quotes Frankenstein; Frankenstein in turn reproduces the speech of the Monster; and the Monster at one point tells us the story of the De Lacey family. Debora and I thought it made sense to try to follow the same pattern in our presentation, and since she’s covered Shelley, I’ll start with Walton.

Shamelessly borrowing from the title of an animated television series, I would characterize Walton as a “Young Frankenstein,” a man similar in mold to the protagonist, but smaller in stature. He has two main functions. The first is to give us a third-person take on Frankenstein, to tell us things about him that Frankenstein wouldn’t tell us about himself, such as his appearance and the manner of his death. His second, more important function, is to give Frankenstein—and probably Shelley—someone to whom to moralize.

Like Frankenstein, Walton aspires to greatness, glory, even immortality. He wants, somehow, to boldly go where no man has gone before. Realizing, however, that he lacks the power of artistic creation, he turns to discovery. “I shall satiate my ardent curiosity with the sight of a part of the world never before visited, and may tread a land never before imprinted by the foot of man. These are my enticements, and they are sufficient to conquer all fear of danger or death.” He is goal-driven, single-minded, even obsessive. He seeks knowledge at any cost, and is willing to sacrifice his own life—and more disturbingly, the lives of others, in this case his crew—to achieve his aim. Using metaphors similar to Frankenstein’s, he describes that aim as “the dominion I should acquire and transmit over the elemental foes of our race.” For these reasons, we should suspect that he may be deceiving himself about his true motives when he writes to Margaret that “you cannot contest the inestimable benefit which I shall confer on all mankind to the last generation.”

Walton and Frankenstein are thus kindred Promethean spirits, and Frankenstein of course recognizes this. “When I reflect,” Frankenstein warns, “that you are pursuing the same course, exposing yourself to the same dangers which have rendered me what I am, I imagine that you may deduce an apt moral from my tale. . . . Learn from me, if not by my precepts, at least by my example, how dangerous is the acquirement of knowledge, and how much happier that man is who believes his native town to be the world, than he who aspires to become greater than his nature will allow.” Despite the hermeneutical problem that Frankenstein is not a moral exemplar and therefore may be an unreliable moralizer, I’m going to venture that this is the message Shelley wants to communicate to us as readers. Subtlety does not appear to be her primary aim in this novel. Notice, though, that the acquirement of knowledge is dangerous but not necessarily wicked or forbidden, and that the man without it may be happier—ignorance is bliss—but not necessarily better off. Shelley is not against knowledge, science, or technology per se, but against a certain kind of attitude.

Walton is only a minor character. Most of the novel, by far, is in the voice of Frankenstein himself, and it is this level of narrative that the Prometheus myth is most present. First of all, however, if Frankenstein is the modern “Prometheus,” how is it modern? The critic George Levine explains:

"[Frankenstein is a] secular myth, with no metaphysical machinery, no gods: the creation is from mortal bodies with the assistance of electricity, not spirit; and the deaths are not pursued beyond the grave. . . . Its modernity lies the transformation of fantasy and traditional Christian and pagan myths into unremitting secularity, into the myth of mankind as it must work within the limits of the visible, physical world" (Levine 6-7).

Many scholars believe that mythology is the precursor to science, as it plays the same function in society: explaining why things are the way they are. In the shift from the ancient to the modern era, the gods have been replaced by “natural forces”—cereal, for example, now grows by photosynthesis rather than by the touch of Ceres—and personalistic explanations have been replaced by impersonal deterministic ones. So Shelley ingeniously transposes the myth into a modern key by having physics and psychology do the work that Zeus and Athena did in the original.

Now, how is Frankenstein like Prometheus? First of all, he’s an extraordinary human being. Even his first name, Victor, means “conqueror” or “champion”—and this is only half ironic. Walton marvels at his intelligence and remarks, “What a glorious creature must he have been in the days of his prosperity when he is thus noble and godlike in ruin! He seems to feel his own worth and the greatness of his fall.” One thing that the critics, at least the ones I’ve read, neglect to point out is that the novel has nearly all the conventions of a Greek tragedy, with Frankenstein cast as the tragic hero. In Aeschylus’s Prometheus Bound, the protagonist, chained to a rock in the wilderness, recounts to the chorus and the audience the story of how he got there. In Frankenstein, the protagonist, confined to a bed on a ship in the Arctic, recounts to Walton the story of how he got there. Both start in medias res, and in both, considering that the past is told in flashback, the actual time elapsed is rather short. Traditionally, the tragic hero is a great being whose hubris and moral blindness are fated to lead him to overreach himself and ultimately come crashing down, providing everyone else with a sobering lesson. As I will argue, both Prometheus and Frankenstein fit this role. It is also interesting that even though Frankenstein is thoroughly secular in mindset, he uses the pagan rhetoric of fate to tell his story. His first disillusionment with science, he says, “was a strong effort of the spirit of good; but it was ineffectual. Destiny was too potent, and her immutable laws had decreed my utter and terrible destruction.”

Second, Frankenstein is like Prometheus in his passion for and possession of knowledge. The latter learns a range of “useful arts” from Athena, the goddess of wisdom. The former studies “every branch of natural philosophy, including mathematics,” under Professor Waldman. Yet he is no connoisseur who delights in learning for its own sake. He realizes that knowledge is power. So it is only after Waldman promises that the modern scientist has “new and almost unlimited powers” and can “perform miracles” that Frankenstein becomes interested. Whereas his sister Elizabeth, who represents the feminine approach, “contemplated with a serious and satisfied spirit the magnificent appearance of things,” he says, “I delighted in investigating their causes. The world was to me a secret which I desired to divine.” His metaphors of discovery involve violence, domination, and control. Consider: “I pursued nature to her hiding places.” And later, “The untaught peasant beheld the elements around him, and was acquainted with their practical uses. The most learned philosopher knew little more. He had partially unveiled the face of Nature, but her immortal lineaments were still a wonder and a mystery. . . . But here were books, and here were men who had penetrated deeper and knew more.” Pursuing, unveiling, and penetrating a feminine object—intentionally or not, his language even suggests rape! One could say that he wants carnal knowledge of Nature.

Again like Prometheus, Frankenstein tells himself that he seeks this knowledge for the good of mankind. But we can see that mankind being benefited is not as important to him as his own status as benefactor. His hubris here is overwhelming:

"So much has been done, exclaimed the soul of Frankenstein [this is the first mention of his name in the novel]—more, more, will I achieve: treading in the steps already marked, I will pioneer a new way, explore unknown powers, and unfold to the world the deepest mysteries of creation. . . . What glory would attend the discovery, if I could banish disease from the human frame, and render man invulnerable to any but a violent death!"

And even greater than a discover and preserver is a creator:

"No one can conceive the variety of feelings which bore me onwards, like a hurricane, in the first enthusiasm of success. Life and death appeared to me ideal bounds, which I should first break through, and pour a torrent of light into our dark world. A new species would bless me as its creator and source; many happy and excellent natures would owe their being to me. No father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I should deserve theirs."

Prometheus creates man out of clay; Frankenstein creates a man out of dead body parts. Interestingly, the more human Frankenstein’s creation becomes, the less human, i.e. the less of a natural and social being, he himself becomes. “[M]y eyes were insensible to the charms of nature,” he recalls. “And the same feelings which made me neglect the scenes around me caused me also to forget those friends who were so many miles absent, and whom I had not seen for so long a time. . . . I had worked hard for nearly two years, for the sole purpose of infusing life into an inanimate body. For this I had deprived myself of rest and health.” As the Monster grows, Frankenstein wastes away, and (jumping ahead a bit) when the creature finally gains consciousness, the creator promptly loses it.

In addition to their wide range of knowledge, the Promethei both possess a powerful secret. The ancient Prometheus hides a spark of Olympian fire inside a fennel-stalk and delivers it to mankind. This part of the myth is highly symbolic, because for some ancient cultures the ability to use fire is the answer to Dr. Bieber’s question, the essence or distinguishing mark of humanity. (And in Disney’s version of The Jungle Book, King Louie of the apes sings to Mowgli, “Give me the power / of man’s red flower / so I can be like you!”) The modern Prometheus has solved the mystery of how to turn a spark of the modern fire, electricity, into the “spark of life,” the “animating principle.”

Though we don’t have time now to explore it in detail, it’s extremely interesting to trace the image of fire throughout the novel. The critic Anne Mellor concisely discusses some of its key occurrences:

"The creature raised from the dead by Victor Frankenstein’s stolen “spark,” after having gradually learned to distinguish between differing sensations and ideas, encounters a fire left by some wandering beggars. His first reaction to Prometheus’ gift is intense delight at its warmth; his second reaction, after having thrust his hand into the live embers, is intense pain. His judgment, “How strange, I thought, that the same cause should produce such opposite effects!”, focuses the moral dilemma of the novel: was the cause that Frankenstein served, the creation of life from death, good or evil or both? The creature’s use of fire thus becomes emblematic. Initially, the creature tries to achieve a reunion with both the natural and the human order by domesticating fire. He learns to tame his fire to his own purposes, using it to provide warmth, light during the night, and heat for cooking his raw nuts and roots. More important, he attempts to ingratiate himself with the De Lacey family by bringing them love-gifts of firewood. But finally, this “tamed” fire and what it represents—the possibility of including the creature around the family hearth or within the circle of civilization—is refused by the De Laceys. . . . Fire now becomes the agency of destruction. The creature, learning that the De Laceys will never return to their cottage and filled with “feelings of revenge and hatred,” burns down the only home he has ever known. . . . Fire, with its forked tongue, is now the instrument of Satan. As such, it recurs in the last moments of the novel, when the creature promises Walton (perhaps falsely) that he shall “consume to ashes this miserable frame” in his funeral pyre at the North Pole" (Mellor 1988:78-79).

Prometheus oversteps his rightful boundaries by flouting Zeus. Frankenstein doesn’t, because there aren’t any gods in Shelley’s novel, at least not as active characters. But he does describe his actions in religious language, as profanation of the sacred. Before bringing the Monster to life, he expresses a purely irreligious attitude: “Darkness had no effect upon my fancy; and a churchyard was to me merely the receptacle of bodies deprived of life.” But afterwards, his “prophetic soul” and despises his “unnatural” activities, his “unhallowed arts,” and his “thrice-accursed hands” and “profane fingers” that “disturbed” what they should have left alone.

In Greek, Prometheus’s name means “forethinker.” Despite his great learning, he lacks wise judgment. In twice deceiving Zeus he shows great strategy and cunning, but he does not think about the consequences. Frankenstein, too, is able to put into action the awesome task of creating a living being. But as soon as it is finished, he does not know what to do with it. He just runs away from it. He remembers, “I traversed the streets, without any clear conception of where I was, or what I was doing.” Furthermore, Mellor points out that “throughout his experiment, Frankenstein never considers the possibility that his creature might not wish the existence he is about to receive. On the contrary, he blithely assumes that the creature will ‘bless’ him and be filled with ‘gratitude.’ . . . He never once considers how such a giant will survive among normal human beings. Nor does he carefully contemplate the features of the creature he is making.” (Mellor 1988:5)

Pandora’s name is synonymous with vicious curiosity. By ignoring the divine warning and opening the box, she inadvertently but irrevocably unleashes a horde of evils upon mankind. Though he doesn’t mention her name, Frankenstein clearly thinks in similar terms of his own decision to create the Monster. “Alas! I had turned loose into the world a depraved wretch, whose delight was in carnage and misery; had he not murdered my brother? . . . I considered the being whom I had cast among mankind, and endowed with the will and power to effect purposes of horror . . . the living monument of presumption and rash ignorance which I had let loose upon the world.” There may also be a parallel between Pandora and the Monster’s bride: Frankenstein doesn’t finish creating her, aborts her in fact, because he believes she will be a Pandora: “she might become ten thousand times more malignant than her mate, and delight, for its own sake, in murder and wretchedness. . . . [F]uture ages might curse me as their pest, whose selfishness had not hesitated to buy its own peace at the price, perhaps, of the existence of the whole human race.” Here he actually does consider the consequences, but it’s arguable that he miscalculates. Had he finished creating her, he might have appeased the monster and averted tragedy.

Clearly not impressed by Prometheus’ audacity, Zeus has the unfortunate Titan chained to a high, cold, and lonely mountainside, where a giant eagle daily pecks out his liver, which grows back every night. The secularity and the realism of Shelley’s novel make such a fate impossible for Frankenstein, yet all the same torments are there for him, translated from external to internal, from visceral to psychological. Frankenstein first encounters the Monster, and with him the consequences of his fatal decision, on top of a very high mountain. Listen to the language here:

"The immense mountains and precipices … spoke of a power mighty as Omnipotence—and I ceased to fear, or to bend before any being less almighty than that which had created and ruled the elements, here displayed in their most terrific guise … [T]he mighty Alps, whose white and shining pyramids and domes towered above all, [struck me] as belonging to another earth, the habitations of another race of beings."

These high, inhospitable, inaccessible mountains, their peaks shrouded in mist, with lightning playing across them, strongly echo Mount Olympus, the home of the Greek gods. It is on this mountain that judgment first comes to Frankenstein. The parallels to the Caucasus Mountains, where Prometheus is enchained, are the small, lonely, barren rock of an island in the Atlantic where Frankenstein works on the Monster’s bride, the actual prison he finds himself in afterward, and ultimately the frozen wastes of the Arctic where he endlessly pursues the Monster.

It is also during this meeting with the Monster that Frankenstein is put in bondage. This bondage, however, is psychological. He places himself under oath to the Monster and thereafter finds that he feels like a “slave.” He can’t go where he likes or do what he likes because of his onerous obligations. He can’t banish the guilt of his deed, the terror of his creation, or the dread of his duty from his mind. “For an instant,” he says, “I dared to shake off my chains, and look around me with a free and lofty spirit; but the iron had eaten into my flesh, and I sank again, trembling and hopeless, into my miserable self.” Ironically, even the secret which he so jealously guarded before is now a burden he longs to get off his chest but cannot.

For the rest of the novel Frankenstein is isolated, sometimes spatially and always morally, from mankind. While on the island, he says “Company was irksome to me,” because of the foulness of his work. But when he’s in society, he cannot enter into it because of his guilt. “I abhorred the face of man,” he says. “Oh, not abhorred! … But I felt that I had not right to share their intercourse.” In his sufferings, he tells us, “solitude was my only consolation—deep, dark, deathlike solitude.” And worst of all, the Monster punishes him by consuming his loved ones. “Know that, one by one, my friends were snatched away; I was left desolate.” In the Arctic his only company is his own desire for revenge.

Since there are no gods in Shelley’s retelling of the myth, the cast is smaller. That’s why the Monster plays several parts: creature, Zeus, and bird. When the Monster has finished his speech, Frankenstein recalls, “I saw him descend the mountain with greater speed than the flight of an eagle.” Like Prometheus’s eagle, Frankenstein’s Monster relentlessly eats away at his soul. And what makes this unending suffering possible for both of them is, ironically, their immortality. Prometheus cannot die because he is a god, and his liver grows back every night. Frankenstein is not literally immortal, but he seems to have a much stronger constitution than the average man. He complains, “Of what materials was I made, that I could thus resist so many shocks, which, like the turning of the wheel, continually renewed the torture? But I was doomed to live.” He now sees immortality not as a blessing but as a curse.

So far I’ve focused exclusively on the Greek subtext of the novel. But one of the things that makes it brilliant is the way that Shelley weaves together several different subtexts. Together with the language of Promethean punishment are the biblical metaphors of hell. When he sees the Monster for the first time, Frankenstein says, “I gnashed my teeth, my eyes became inflamed.” At another point he says, “I … felt the never-dying worm alive in my bosom.” And one especially remarkable use of this language takes place when Frankenstein is returning home and approaches the Alps. “I saw the lightnings playing on the summit of Mont Blanc. . . . [V]ivid flashes of lightning dazzled my eyes, illuminating the lake, making it appear like a vast sheet of fire; then for an instant everything seemed of pitchy darkness, until the eye recovered itself from the preceding flash.” Shelley manages to combine two contradictory biblical images, the darkness and the lake of fire! But on the biblical sources of the novel, others have written.

Tuesday, January 20, 2009

The Social Lives of Elephants (Long Essay)

If there’s any common thread that ties together all the different disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities, it’s that all of them try, in different ways, to answer the question, “What does it mean to be a person?” Since human beings have nearly always thought of themselves as the only persons living on this planet, closely bound up with that question is another: “What is unique about human beings?” These questions are much too broad and much too philosophical for definitive answers, but many people have suggested that the answer to both has something to do with having intelligence, or moral consciousness, or emotions, or the ability to communicate and form relationships with others. Though I couldn’t begin to prove it in five minutes, I suggest that studying elephants—of all things—might make us want to rethink the way we frame these problems. In her book The Astonishing Elephant, Shana Alexander writes, “Physiologically, elephants are unique—entirely different from all other mammals. Yet, since antiquity, observers have agreed that the elephant is the animal most akin to man.” That is, elephants show, in at least a primitive form, many of the features of personhood. Perhaps the things that make us humans beings unique are not entirely the same as the things that make us persons.

Although there are a few solitary elephants, “loners” or “hermits,” most elephants live in one of two kinds of groups, cow herds and bull herds. Here is a photograph of a cow herd. Cow herds are tightly-knit and permanent groups of related females and their calves, led by the oldest and most dominant female, the matriarch. According to Dan Freeman, in Elephants: The Vanishing Giants, these are usually between 10 and 50 animals, but they can be as large as 500. Now and then, such as when the matriarch dies, they split into smaller groups. When a male calf reaches maturity, the cows drive him away, violently if necessary. For a while he tries to return, but they won’t let him. Eventually, he joins up with a bull herd. Bull herds are much looser, temporary groups of mature males. Their association seems to be based not on blood but on friendship, enjoying each other’s company, and on self-interest, as being part of a group provides mutual advantages. The more stable bull herds sort themselves into a hierarchy based on dominance, which is usually based on size, which—since male elephants never stop growing—is in turn based on age. Cow herds and bull herds are aware of each other, but they usually only come together to mate. These herds are not self-contained; they are part of a larger network of kinship groups in the wider geographical area. The distinguished zoologist Joyce Poole writes in Growing Up with Elephants, “Elephant society is complex and multi-tiered, involving other families, clans, and subpopulations. Eventually, an adult elephant will know every elephant in its population and will know its relationship and position with regard to each.”

Essential to being part of society is being able to communicate with each other. Elephants communicate intensely through a complex “language” that involves all of their senses. Visual communication, to begin with, mostly involves the positioning of the head and the trunk. Although the significance of each is not understood, scientists have recognized at least twenty different postures on the scale of aggression to submission. The most aggressive is the intimidation posture, which looks like this: the elephant faces its opponent directly, raises its head, and spreads its ears at right angles to its head, making it look much bigger. Sometimes it will shake its head back and forth, causing its ears to snap sharply against its head, trumpet loudly, toss up dust and bushes, and even bluff a charge.

The second kind of communication is oral. Elephants can make at least thirty different vocal sounds, including trumpets, squeals, growls, rumbles, and sounds too low-pitched for humans to hear. Poole classifies these sounds into several types: dominance, sexual excitement, social excitement, group dynamics and coordination, social fear, surprise, and distress. Other experts think there is a sound for reassurance. One sound, the “let’s go” rumble, could be considered symbolic and therefore an instance of language. As in our own species, female elephants are much more chatty than males. They vocalize much more, and nineteen of the sounds are used exclusively by females.

Not all communication is “verbal”—much of it is tactile. Elephants touch either frequently, and for many reasons. Sometimes it’s aggressive. Bulls competing for mating privileges, like these ones, will engage in shoving matches, which are forceful but rarely harmful. Sometimes it’s playful. Young elephants bounce off each other, climb on each other, and even “trunk wrestle." Most often, however, it’s affectionate. When two of them meet after having been separated, they extend touch the tips of their trunks together in something like a handshake. When they are together, they stroke and caress each other with their trunks and forefeet. They find it reassuring.

Finally, elephants communicate by smell and even taste. They emit bodily chemicals to mark territory, for example, or to indicate when they are in heat. This may be another reason they put their trunks in each other’s mouths.

We’ve seen some elephant affection already; but by far the most affectionate elephant relationship is between a mother and her calf. Since the bull wanders off soon after mating, the cow gives birth surrounded by her female relatives. This is a cause of great excitement for them: they crowd around the calf, making affectionate noises and trying to touch it and pick it up. Clearly, they find it adorable. If this little guy didn’t weigh 250 pounds, I’d try to pick him up too. Elephant mothers are exceptionally doting, nearly always cuddling with their children and indulging their every need. There are many stories of mother elephants going to heroic and sacrificial lengths to protect their babies.

Yet parenting can be an exhausting job. It takes a village to raise a child—or in this case, it takes a herd. When the mother needs a rest, the juvenile cows in the herd, called “allomothers” or “aunties” take over. According to Jeheskel Shoshani, in Elephants: Majestic Creatures of the Wild, their job is “following [the calves], standing over them while they are sleeping, getting them up when the family moves on, helping them if they get stuck in the mud or caught up in a bush, running to their aid if they make a distress call, and chasing after them and bringing them back if they wander.” Eltringham writes that Many of the skills an elephant needs to survive are not innate but have to be learned from others. So the older elephants are educators. They are also disciplinarians: they will spank young elephants with their trunks if they get out of line. When these young elephants reach maturity at about fourteen years old, the females are taught child care and the males are expelled from the herd.

If birth is an emotional time for elephants, so is death. Unlike any other animals except humans, elephants seem to have an awareness of their mortality. Sadly, sometimes birth and death occur together, if a calf is stillborn. When this happens, the herd will wait as the bereaved mother stands off by herself for a day or two, holding her dead child on her tusks. When an adult elephant is dying, either of age or of something else, the others may stand next to him, propping him up. When he finally dies, they stand over his body for a long time, caressing it with their feet or their trunks, sometimes even weeping elephant tears. According to Alexander, they often return the next day to pay their respects, and sometimes they bury the body by covering it with dirt or branches. And this may be the most uncanny thing of all: when elephants come across skeletons of other animals, they ignore them, but when they come across elephant bones, they react differently. Poole writes, “They approach slowly and silently, and then the touching begins, slowly, as they deliberately, carefully turn a skull over and over with their trunks, touching, hovering over the long bones with their hind feet.”

This is a sobering observation—and, I think, an appropriate place to conclude. I’ve shown that elephants have a complex social organization, a sophisticated system of communication, what appear to be deep bonds between them (especially between mothers and children), and a way of responding to death that is strangely similar to that of our own species. Whether these things make them persons or not, I’ll let you decide.

The Ganges: Public Health Nightmare (Short Essay)

The Ganges River of northern India may be the most polluted body of water in the world. It may also have the greatest variety of pollutants. Some of them are toxic byproducts of industry: “pharmaceutical companies, electronics plants, textile and paper industries, tanneries, fertilizer manufacturers and oil refineries discharge effluent into the river. This hazardous waste includes hydrochloric acid, mercury and other heavy metals, bleaches and dyes, pesticides, and polychlorinated biphenyls … Runoff from farms in the Ganges basin adds chemical fertilizers and pesticides such as DDT.” Most of them, however, are organic. In Varanasi alone, the river swallows the remains of 40,000 human corpses a year—some cremated, some partially cremated, and some whole—not to mention the dead cattle. Worst yet is the daily dump of hundreds of million gallons of raw sewage. Fecal coliform counts are dangerously high, 100 times the government’s acceptable standard for bathing according to one source and 67000 times according to another. People who use this water risk hepatitis, typhoid, cholera, amoebic dysentery, other waterborne diseases, and a variety of skin afflictions.

Despite these dangers, however, the Ganges, or Ganga in the vernacular, is the most desired destination in India. In Varanasi alone, an average of 60,000 people a day immerse themselves in the river. During the Kumbh Mela festival every several years, millions of pilgrims (estimates vary from 20 million to an incredible 70 million) make their way to Allahabad, another riverside city, for a ritual bath. So many unwashed bodies, of course, add even more contaminants to the water. Nevertheless, many even drink it and carry bottles back to their relatives.

Needless to say, this is a public health crisis. One of the unspoken lessons of the course so far is that public health situations, like all social or environmental situations, are part of a complex web of causes and effects, none of which is an independent variable. Some of them are common and predictable, and some of them are strange and surprising. The economic causes of the Ganges pollution are what you might expect. A century of booming population in India has concentrated in cities near the river. Infrastructure is weak, and the government lacks the resources to clean the water: for example, electricity is scarce, and the sewage pumps and water treatment plants suffer frequent power failures. Many citizens have no access to any other water source, either because they can’t afford it or because it simply isn’t available.

There are, however, some interesting religious and cultural causes for this crisis as well. According to Indian mythology, the Mother Ganges is a goddess who long ago descended from the sky to resurrect the ashes of an ancient king’s ancestors. Now, any Hindu who dips in or drinks from her, especially at the holy city of Varanasi, is freed from a great deal of karmic debt. Anyone whose remains are scattered in her escapes immediately from the cycle of reincarnation. And she is the most respectful resting place for the carcasses of holy cows.

These beliefs have a powerful grip on Hindu minds, powerful enough in many cases to neutralize warnings of health risks. Christians aren’t the only ones for whom science and faith are at odds! Some pilgrims are simply unaware of the river’s pollution, or even unaware of the microbial origins of disease. Many refuse to believe that holy water can be dangerous, despite the evidence. “‘Ganga is my mother, it could never harm me,’ says Hanuman Sahani, a lifetime boatman … [who] uses the water—straight from the river—for worship, but also to drink and brush his teeth.” Others are willing to take the physical risks, which they consider insignificant next to the spiritual benefits. Or sometimes even social benefits: a friend of mine, an American Christian, jumped in to show solidarity with his Hindu friends. And for whatever reason, a number of Western tourists, presumably educated ones, enter the water every year. All of this shows that informing and warning people may not be enough to keep them from hazardous behaviors, even those that we think are avoidable. Sometimes dogma yields to pragmatism: this January a group of sadhus (holy men) threatened to boycott the Kumbh Mela unless the government did something about the water conditions. The government settled on a temporary solution, “ordering Uttar Pradesh officials to release 1500 cubic feet per second of water every day from the Arora dam.” Yet even without this measure, most Hindus would have continued doing what they have always done.

If a river this polluted ran through the United States, the government would almost certainly have kept people out of it, by force if necessary. This is not an option for the Indian government. Although it is a secular democracy, most of its officials are Hindus. And even if they wanted to, they couldn’t. The consequences breaking a millennia-old tradition by fencing off the holiest pilgrimage site in the world would be unthinkable. Furthermore, Indians tend to be proud of their culture and have a strong sense of honor, and one of the consequences is that the government tends to conceal or downplay its problems. This is why the only accurate reports of water quality come from private organizations. The Ganga Action Plan, initiated in 1985, tried to set up water treatment systems and to target polluting industries, but its measures all failed for a variety of reasons. Since then the government has made little to no attempt to warn people about the river’s dangers. Furthermore, probably because of Hinduism’s influence, Indian culture has less of a sense of civic action and cooperation, commitment to the public good, and responsibility for shared resources than Western culture. This may be why nobody in particular feels personally responsible to keep the river clean.

Interestingly, some Indian intellectuals have found one at least partially effective strategy to keep people out of the Ganges. It involves sensitivity to people’s religious sensibilities. You could call it an integration of faith and learning. One activist explains that “to tell a Hindu that Ganga, goddess and mother, is “polluted” or “dirty” is an insult; it suggests that she is no longer sacred. Rather, the approach must acknowledge that human action, not the holy river herself, is responsible: ‘We are allowing our mother to be defiled.’” Another activist simply “explains to devout Hindus that Mother Ganges is not feeling well. She can be cured by eradicating pollution.”

Is Philosophy Architecture or Cartography? (Long Essay)

Though their lifetimes were nearly three hundred years apart, Rene Descartes and Edmund Husserl had many things in common. Both were trained as mathematicians and only later turned to philosophy; both brought from mathematics a taste for rigorous analysis and exactitude, a thirst for certainty, and a hatred of skepticism; both were dissatisfied with the philosophical climate of their times, a decadent Scholasticism for Descartes and an exhausted Kantian / post-Kantian idealism for Husserl; both sought firmly to ground the other more specialized sciences in a kind of “first philosophy”; and both had an enormous impact on Western thought. Descartes is in many ways considered the founder of the whole modern tradition in philosophy, and Husserl is without a doubt the primary figure in the most influential movement of twentieth-century continental philosophy, phenomenology. Given their similar aims, however, it is instructive to contrast their methods. (Doing so also dispels the myth that philosophy never advances as a discipline). Husserl admired Descartes and sympathized with his goals—in fact, he even entitled one of his mature works Cartesian Meditations—but he was convinced that his predecessor had taken a wrong turn at the very beginning of his journey.

In spite of his plan to doubt everything, according to Husserl, Descartes had failed to call into question a fundamental assumption: the representative theory of perception. The assumption is that the world and the things that make it up are outside our minds, but what we have access to through our senses are representations, images, copies of those things inside our minds. The obvious question that arises is, How do we know that those representations match the real things? We don’t, and we can’t. This leads either to some sort of idealism (Berkeley, Kant) or to skepticism. Descartes is concerned with the latter. He writes,

Everything which I have thus far accepted as entirely true and assured has been acquired from the senses or by means of the senses. But I have learned by experience that these senses sometimes mislead me, and it is prudent never to trust wholly to those things which have once deceived us.

Convinced that sensation/perception is unreliable (as a pre-Kantian, he doesn’t make the distinction), he decides to doubt all of his perceptual beliefs and all beliefs that are based on them. He calls the existence of the entire external world into question, and in search of a better foundation, retreats inside his own mind. He finds what he is looking for in the cogito, the intuition of his existence as “a thing which thinks,” and then immediately in a deductive demonstration of the existence of a non-deceiving God. This, he believes, is the rock-solid foundation on which we can build an indestructible edifice of certain knowledge.

Unfortunately, Descartes’ successors quickly point out how in each of these two steps he smuggles in unwarranted metaphysical assumptions, and how when he is finished we are still left with an intractable mind-body problem, among other difficulties. They agree that Descartes’ problem is unsolved and that a chasm still yawns between representation and reality, mind and matter, thoughts and things. Here Husserl makes his first bold move: he argues that everyone’s mistake is falsely thinking of thinking in spatial metaphors. One consequence of this is that Husserl flatly denies the representative theory of perception. When we examine consciousness, he points out, we find that it is intentional, that is, directed, consciousness-of. It is irreducibly composed of a subject pole/aspect (the conscious ego and the act by which it is directed), an object pole (what it is directed toward), and a meaning pole (what the object is understood as). Now, if the object were simply an image, it would be entirely contained within consciousness, part of the act. But reflection shows that objects actually transcend consciousness. First, if I look at, say, a particular tree several times on different occasions, or if several different people look at it at once, it is clearly the same tree we are seeing, not different ones. Second, when we look at the tree from different angles or under different conditions, we see different parts of it. It is never fully present at once, the way an act is. Third, our very concept of a representation requires acquaintance with that-which-is-represented. You wouldn’t be able to think of, say, a painting of a landscape as a representation unless you had some sort of acquaintance with landscapes. You wouldn’t be able to recognize dreams or hallucinations for what they are unless you had at some point not been dreaming or hallucinating.

So global skepticism like Descartes’, the idea that we only have access to representations, is incoherent. “Since the interpretation of anything as an image presupposes an object intentionally given to consciousness, we should plainly have a regressus in infinitum were we again to let this latter object itself be constituted through an image.” We have direct, unmediated acquaintance with objects as presentations. “We are always already in contact with being.” To invert Plato’s parable, philosophers have thought they were in a cave, specifically a bony one filled with squishy gray matter. In fact, they have all along been sitting in broad daylight, and what they thought were shadows on the wall were actually the real things. Husserl’s second target, the equivalent of Descartes’ evil demon, is psychologism, the doctrine that the laws of logic are rooted in the nature of the human mind, not in the nature of reality. He argues that psychologism confuses acts of knowing, which are temporal, with the objects of knowledge, in this case the eternal, abstract, ideal, entities and laws of logic. The difference is evident under phenomenological investigation.

With the skeptical problematic out of the way, the primary task is no longer to construct a deductive metaphysical system. Without a doubt that objects are given to us, the fundamental question is how they are given to us. Thus Husserl calls for a return “to the things themselves.” He considers himself an epistemological realist, claiming that we know things as they actually are, but he is neither a metaphysical realist nor a metaphysical idealist. He believes that consciousness is essentially intended toward objects, while objects are essentially possibilities for intending subjects, and therefore it is incoherent to think of one without the other. The world only appears, and only could appear, in consciousness. It follows that that the first-person perspective is prior to the third-person perspective. So the work of phenomenology, as “first philosophy” and the grounding for all other sciences, is to clarify and demarcate the “phenomenological realm,” that is, the essential structures of consciousness. This requires epoche, that is, suspending or bracketing—not Cartesian doubting, which is incoherent—our metaphysical assumptions and judgments, including those of existence. In doing so we pass from the natural attitude to the presuppositionless phenomenological attitude.

The phenomenologist is less of an architect than a surveyor and cartographer (although, unfortunately, this too is a spatial metaphor). Before jumping to hasty metaphysical conclusions, as Descartes does, Husserl wants to linger in the phenomenological realm until it has been fully explored. Like the scholastic realists, he discovers that both acts and objects come to us in distinct, intelligible, essential structures. We can intend the same object through different kinds of acts, such as seeing, remembering, imagining, and signifying. Or we can with the same act intend different kinds of objects, such as physical objects, states of affairs, propositions, and abstract entities (categorial objects). We can intend the same object with different meanings, or the different objects with the same meaning. All of these need to be classified. In practice, our consciousness consists of multilayered intentions and complex objects, which needed to be sorted out. There is also the question of what in experience is constituted by the subject and what is constituted by the object. Fundamental ontology inquires into the general categories of being; regional ontology inquires more specifically into certain portions of the phenomenological realm. As regional ontologies, the special sciences need to be demarcated and situated within it. We can perform the eidetic reduction to determine which elements of a thing are essential and which are accidental. And finally, we can perform the transcendental reduction, which inquires into the conditions of the possibility of experience in general. This is an enormous array of tasks; and unlike Descartes, who sought to complete his project alone in his “stove” in a matter of days, Husserl emphasizes that phenomenology is a communal endeavor that takes lifetimes.